Branch data Line data Source code
1 : : /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 : : *
3 : : * backend_startup.c
4 : : * Backend startup code
5 : : *
6 : : * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2026, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
7 : : * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
8 : : *
9 : : *
10 : : * IDENTIFICATION
11 : : * src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c
12 : : *
13 : : *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 : : */
15 : :
16 : : #include "postgres.h"
17 : :
18 : : #include <unistd.h>
19 : :
20 : : #include "access/xlog.h"
21 : : #include "access/xlogrecovery.h"
22 : : #include "common/ip.h"
23 : : #include "common/string.h"
24 : : #include "libpq/libpq.h"
25 : : #include "libpq/libpq-be.h"
26 : : #include "libpq/pqformat.h"
27 : : #include "libpq/pqsignal.h"
28 : : #include "miscadmin.h"
29 : : #include "postmaster/postmaster.h"
30 : : #include "replication/walsender.h"
31 : : #include "storage/fd.h"
32 : : #include "storage/ipc.h"
33 : : #include "storage/procsignal.h"
34 : : #include "storage/proc.h"
35 : : #include "tcop/backend_startup.h"
36 : : #include "tcop/tcopprot.h"
37 : : #include "utils/builtins.h"
38 : : #include "utils/guc_hooks.h"
39 : : #include "utils/injection_point.h"
40 : : #include "utils/memutils.h"
41 : : #include "utils/ps_status.h"
42 : : #include "utils/timeout.h"
43 : : #include "utils/varlena.h"
44 : :
45 : : /* GUCs */
46 : : bool Trace_connection_negotiation = false;
47 : : uint32 log_connections = 0;
48 : : char *log_connections_string = NULL;
49 : :
50 : : /* Other globals */
51 : :
52 : : /*
53 : : * ConnectionTiming stores timestamps of various points in connection
54 : : * establishment and setup.
55 : : * ready_for_use is initialized to a special value here so we can check if
56 : : * we've already set it before doing so in PostgresMain().
57 : : */
58 : : ConnectionTiming conn_timing = {.ready_for_use = TIMESTAMP_MINUS_INFINITY};
59 : :
60 : : static void BackendInitialize(ClientSocket *client_sock, CAC_state cac);
61 : : static int ProcessSSLStartup(Port *port);
62 : : static int ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool ssl_done, bool gss_done);
63 : : static void ProcessCancelRequestPacket(Port *port, void *pkt, int pktlen);
64 : : static void SendNegotiateProtocolVersion(List *unrecognized_protocol_options);
65 : : static void process_startup_packet_die(SIGNAL_ARGS);
66 : : static void StartupPacketTimeoutHandler(void);
67 : : static bool validate_log_connections_options(List *elemlist, uint32 *flags);
68 : :
69 : : /*
70 : : * Entry point for a new backend process.
71 : : *
72 : : * Initialize the connection, read the startup packet, authenticate the
73 : : * client, and start the main processing loop.
74 : : */
75 : : void
76 : 315 : BackendMain(const void *startup_data, size_t startup_data_len)
77 : : {
78 : 315 : const BackendStartupData *bsdata = startup_data;
79 : :
80 [ + - ]: 315 : Assert(startup_data_len == sizeof(BackendStartupData));
81 [ + - ]: 315 : Assert(MyClientSocket != NULL);
82 : :
83 : : #ifdef EXEC_BACKEND
84 : :
85 : : /*
86 : : * Need to reinitialize the SSL library in the backend, since the context
87 : : * structures contain function pointers and cannot be passed through the
88 : : * parameter file.
89 : : *
90 : : * If for some reason reload fails (maybe the user installed broken key
91 : : * files), soldier on without SSL; that's better than all connections
92 : : * becoming impossible.
93 : : *
94 : : * XXX should we do this in all child processes? For the moment it's
95 : : * enough to do it in backend children.
96 : : */
97 : : #ifdef USE_SSL
98 : : if (EnableSSL)
99 : : {
100 : : if (secure_initialize(false) == 0)
101 : : LoadedSSL = true;
102 : : else
103 : : ereport(LOG,
104 : : (errmsg("SSL configuration could not be loaded in child process")));
105 : : }
106 : : #endif
107 : : #endif
108 : :
109 : : /* Perform additional initialization and collect startup packet */
110 : 315 : BackendInitialize(MyClientSocket, bsdata->canAcceptConnections);
111 : :
112 : : /*
113 : : * Create a per-backend PGPROC struct in shared memory. We must do this
114 : : * before we can use LWLocks or access any shared memory.
115 : : */
116 : 315 : InitProcess();
117 : :
118 : : /*
119 : : * Make sure we aren't in PostmasterContext anymore. (We can't delete it
120 : : * just yet, though, because InitPostgres will need the HBA data.)
121 : : */
122 : 315 : MemoryContextSwitchTo(TopMemoryContext);
123 : :
124 : 315 : PostgresMain(MyProcPort->database_name, MyProcPort->user_name);
125 : : }
126 : :
127 : :
128 : : /*
129 : : * BackendInitialize -- initialize an interactive (postmaster-child)
130 : : * backend process, and collect the client's startup packet.
131 : : *
132 : : * returns: nothing. Will not return at all if there's any failure.
133 : : *
134 : : * Note: this code does not depend on having any access to shared memory.
135 : : * Indeed, our approach to SIGTERM/timeout handling *requires* that
136 : : * shared memory not have been touched yet; see comments within.
137 : : * In the EXEC_BACKEND case, we are physically attached to shared memory
138 : : * but have not yet set up most of our local pointers to shmem structures.
139 : : */
140 : : static void
141 : 315 : BackendInitialize(ClientSocket *client_sock, CAC_state cac)
142 : : {
143 : 315 : int status;
144 : 315 : int ret;
145 : 315 : Port *port;
146 : 315 : char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST];
147 : 315 : char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
148 : 315 : StringInfoData ps_data;
149 : 315 : MemoryContext oldcontext;
150 : :
151 : : /* Tell fd.c about the long-lived FD associated with the client_sock */
152 : 315 : ReserveExternalFD();
153 : :
154 : : /*
155 : : * PreAuthDelay is a debugging aid for investigating problems in the
156 : : * authentication cycle: it can be set in postgresql.conf to allow time to
157 : : * attach to the newly-forked backend with a debugger. (See also
158 : : * PostAuthDelay, which we allow clients to pass through PGOPTIONS, but it
159 : : * is not honored until after authentication.)
160 : : */
161 [ + - ]: 315 : if (PreAuthDelay > 0)
162 : 0 : pg_usleep(PreAuthDelay * 1000000L);
163 : :
164 : : /* This flag will remain set until InitPostgres finishes authentication */
165 : 315 : ClientAuthInProgress = true; /* limit visibility of log messages */
166 : :
167 : : /*
168 : : * Initialize libpq and enable reporting of ereport errors to the client.
169 : : * Must do this now because authentication uses libpq to send messages.
170 : : *
171 : : * The Port structure and all data structures attached to it are allocated
172 : : * in TopMemoryContext, so that they survive into PostgresMain execution.
173 : : * We need not worry about leaking this storage on failure, since we
174 : : * aren't in the postmaster process anymore.
175 : : */
176 : 315 : oldcontext = MemoryContextSwitchTo(TopMemoryContext);
177 : 315 : port = MyProcPort = pq_init(client_sock);
178 : 315 : MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcontext);
179 : :
180 : 315 : whereToSendOutput = DestRemote; /* now safe to ereport to client */
181 : :
182 : : /* set these to empty in case they are needed before we set them up */
183 : 315 : port->remote_host = "";
184 : 315 : port->remote_port = "";
185 : :
186 : : /*
187 : : * We arrange to do _exit(1) if we receive SIGTERM or timeout while trying
188 : : * to collect the startup packet; while SIGQUIT results in _exit(2).
189 : : * Otherwise the postmaster cannot shutdown the database FAST or IMMED
190 : : * cleanly if a buggy client fails to send the packet promptly.
191 : : *
192 : : * Exiting with _exit(1) is only possible because we have not yet touched
193 : : * shared memory; therefore no outside-the-process state needs to get
194 : : * cleaned up.
195 : : */
196 : 315 : pqsignal(SIGTERM, process_startup_packet_die);
197 : : /* SIGQUIT handler was already set up by InitPostmasterChild */
198 : 315 : InitializeTimeouts(); /* establishes SIGALRM handler */
199 : 315 : sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &StartupBlockSig, NULL);
200 : :
201 : : /*
202 : : * Get the remote host name and port for logging and status display.
203 : : */
204 : 315 : remote_host[0] = '\0';
205 : 315 : remote_port[0] = '\0';
206 : 630 : if ((ret = pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
207 : 315 : remote_host, sizeof(remote_host),
208 : 315 : remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
209 [ + - + - ]: 630 : (log_hostname ? 0 : NI_NUMERICHOST) | NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
210 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(WARNING,
211 : : (errmsg_internal("pg_getnameinfo_all() failed: %s",
212 : : gai_strerror(ret))));
213 : :
214 : : /*
215 : : * Save remote_host and remote_port in port structure (after this, they
216 : : * will appear in log_line_prefix data for log messages).
217 : : */
218 : 315 : port->remote_host = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, remote_host);
219 : 315 : port->remote_port = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, remote_port);
220 : :
221 : : /* And now we can log that the connection was received, if enabled */
222 [ + - ]: 315 : if (log_connections & LOG_CONNECTION_RECEIPT)
223 : : {
224 [ # # ]: 0 : if (remote_port[0])
225 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
226 : : (errmsg("connection received: host=%s port=%s",
227 : : remote_host,
228 : : remote_port)));
229 : : else
230 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
231 : : (errmsg("connection received: host=%s",
232 : : remote_host)));
233 : 0 : }
234 : :
235 : : /* For testing client error handling */
236 : : #ifdef USE_INJECTION_POINTS
237 : : INJECTION_POINT("backend-initialize", NULL);
238 : : if (IS_INJECTION_POINT_ATTACHED("backend-initialize-v2-error"))
239 : : {
240 : : /*
241 : : * This simulates an early error from a pre-v14 server, which used the
242 : : * version 2 protocol for any errors that occurred before processing
243 : : * the startup packet.
244 : : */
245 : : FrontendProtocol = PG_PROTOCOL(2, 0);
246 : : elog(FATAL, "protocol version 2 error triggered");
247 : : }
248 : : #endif
249 : :
250 : : /*
251 : : * If we did a reverse lookup to name, we might as well save the results
252 : : * rather than possibly repeating the lookup during authentication.
253 : : *
254 : : * Note that we don't want to specify NI_NAMEREQD above, because then we'd
255 : : * get nothing useful for a client without an rDNS entry. Therefore, we
256 : : * must check whether we got a numeric IPv4 or IPv6 address, and not save
257 : : * it into remote_hostname if so. (This test is conservative and might
258 : : * sometimes classify a hostname as numeric, but an error in that
259 : : * direction is safe; it only results in a possible extra lookup.)
260 : : */
261 [ - + ]: 315 : if (log_hostname &&
262 [ # # ]: 0 : ret == 0 &&
263 [ # # # # ]: 0 : strspn(remote_host, "0123456789.") < strlen(remote_host) &&
264 : 0 : strspn(remote_host, "0123456789ABCDEFabcdef:") < strlen(remote_host))
265 : : {
266 : 0 : port->remote_hostname = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, remote_host);
267 : 0 : }
268 : :
269 : : /*
270 : : * Ready to begin client interaction. We will give up and _exit(1) after
271 : : * a time delay, so that a broken client can't hog a connection
272 : : * indefinitely. PreAuthDelay and any DNS interactions above don't count
273 : : * against the time limit.
274 : : *
275 : : * Note: AuthenticationTimeout is applied here while waiting for the
276 : : * startup packet, and then again in InitPostgres for the duration of any
277 : : * authentication operations. So a hostile client could tie up the
278 : : * process for nearly twice AuthenticationTimeout before we kick him off.
279 : : *
280 : : * Note: because PostgresMain will call InitializeTimeouts again, the
281 : : * registration of STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT will be lost. This is okay
282 : : * since we never use it again after this function.
283 : : */
284 : 315 : RegisterTimeout(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, StartupPacketTimeoutHandler);
285 : 315 : enable_timeout_after(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, AuthenticationTimeout * 1000);
286 : :
287 : : /* Handle direct SSL handshake */
288 : 315 : status = ProcessSSLStartup(port);
289 : :
290 : : /*
291 : : * Receive the startup packet (which might turn out to be a cancel request
292 : : * packet).
293 : : */
294 [ - + ]: 315 : if (status == STATUS_OK)
295 : 315 : status = ProcessStartupPacket(port, false, false);
296 : :
297 : : /*
298 : : * If we're going to reject the connection due to database state, say so
299 : : * now instead of wasting cycles on an authentication exchange. (This also
300 : : * allows a pg_ping utility to be written.)
301 : : */
302 [ - + ]: 315 : if (status == STATUS_OK)
303 : : {
304 [ + - - - : 315 : switch (cac)
- - ]
305 : : {
306 : : case CAC_STARTUP:
307 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
308 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW),
309 : : errmsg("the database system is starting up")));
310 : 0 : break;
311 : : case CAC_NOTHOTSTANDBY:
312 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!EnableHotStandby)
313 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
314 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW),
315 : : errmsg("the database system is not accepting connections"),
316 : : errdetail("Hot standby mode is disabled.")));
317 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (reachedConsistency)
318 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
319 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW),
320 : : errmsg("the database system is not yet accepting connections"),
321 : : errdetail("Recovery snapshot is not yet ready for hot standby."),
322 : : errhint("To enable hot standby, close write transactions with more than %d subtransactions on the primary server.",
323 : : PGPROC_MAX_CACHED_SUBXIDS)));
324 : : else
325 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
326 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW),
327 : : errmsg("the database system is not yet accepting connections"),
328 : : errdetail("Consistent recovery state has not been yet reached.")));
329 : 0 : break;
330 : : case CAC_SHUTDOWN:
331 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
332 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW),
333 : : errmsg("the database system is shutting down")));
334 : 0 : break;
335 : : case CAC_RECOVERY:
336 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
337 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW),
338 : : errmsg("the database system is in recovery mode")));
339 : 0 : break;
340 : : case CAC_TOOMANY:
341 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
342 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS),
343 : : errmsg("sorry, too many clients already")));
344 : 0 : break;
345 : : case CAC_OK:
346 : : break;
347 : : }
348 : 315 : }
349 : :
350 : : /*
351 : : * Disable the timeout, and prevent SIGTERM again.
352 : : */
353 : 315 : disable_timeout(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, false);
354 : 315 : sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &BlockSig, NULL);
355 : :
356 : : /*
357 : : * As a safety check that nothing in startup has yet performed
358 : : * shared-memory modifications that would need to be undone if we had
359 : : * exited through SIGTERM or timeout above, check that no on_shmem_exit
360 : : * handlers have been registered yet. (This isn't terribly bulletproof,
361 : : * since someone might misuse an on_proc_exit handler for shmem cleanup,
362 : : * but it's a cheap and helpful check. We cannot disallow on_proc_exit
363 : : * handlers unfortunately, since pq_init() already registered one.)
364 : : */
365 : 315 : check_on_shmem_exit_lists_are_empty();
366 : :
367 : : /*
368 : : * Stop here if it was bad or a cancel packet. ProcessStartupPacket
369 : : * already did any appropriate error reporting.
370 : : */
371 [ + - ]: 315 : if (status != STATUS_OK)
372 : 0 : proc_exit(0);
373 : :
374 : : /*
375 : : * Now that we have the user and database name, we can set the process
376 : : * title for ps. It's good to do this as early as possible in startup.
377 : : */
378 : 315 : initStringInfo(&ps_data);
379 [ + - ]: 315 : if (am_walsender)
380 : 0 : appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "%s ", GetBackendTypeDesc(B_WAL_SENDER));
381 : 315 : appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "%s ", port->user_name);
382 [ - + ]: 315 : if (port->database_name[0] != '\0')
383 : 315 : appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "%s ", port->database_name);
384 : 315 : appendStringInfoString(&ps_data, port->remote_host);
385 [ + - ]: 315 : if (port->remote_port[0] != '\0')
386 : 0 : appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "(%s)", port->remote_port);
387 : :
388 : 315 : init_ps_display(ps_data.data);
389 : 315 : pfree(ps_data.data);
390 : :
391 : 315 : set_ps_display("initializing");
392 : 315 : }
393 : :
394 : : /*
395 : : * Check for a direct SSL connection.
396 : : *
397 : : * This happens before the startup packet so we are careful not to actually
398 : : * read any bytes from the stream if it's not a direct SSL connection.
399 : : */
400 : : static int
401 : 315 : ProcessSSLStartup(Port *port)
402 : : {
403 : 315 : int firstbyte;
404 : :
405 [ + - ]: 315 : Assert(!port->ssl_in_use);
406 : :
407 : 315 : pq_startmsgread();
408 : 315 : firstbyte = pq_peekbyte();
409 : 315 : pq_endmsgread();
410 [ + - ]: 315 : if (firstbyte == EOF)
411 : : {
412 : : /*
413 : : * Like in ProcessStartupPacket, if we get no data at all, don't
414 : : * clutter the log with a complaint.
415 : : */
416 : 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
417 : : }
418 : :
419 [ + - ]: 315 : if (firstbyte != 0x16)
420 : : {
421 : : /* Not an SSL handshake message */
422 : 315 : return STATUS_OK;
423 : : }
424 : :
425 : : /*
426 : : * First byte indicates standard SSL handshake message
427 : : *
428 : : * (It can't be a Postgres startup length because in network byte order
429 : : * that would be a startup packet hundreds of megabytes long)
430 : : */
431 : :
432 : : #ifdef USE_SSL
433 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (!LoadedSSL || port->laddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
434 : : {
435 : : /* SSL not supported */
436 : 0 : goto reject;
437 : : }
438 : :
439 [ # # ]: 0 : if (secure_open_server(port) == -1)
440 : : {
441 : : /*
442 : : * we assume secure_open_server() sent an appropriate TLS alert
443 : : * already
444 : : */
445 : 0 : goto reject;
446 : : }
447 [ # # ]: 0 : Assert(port->ssl_in_use);
448 : :
449 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!port->alpn_used)
450 : : {
451 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
452 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
453 : : errmsg("received direct SSL connection request without ALPN protocol negotiation extension")));
454 : 0 : goto reject;
455 : : }
456 : :
457 [ # # ]: 0 : if (Trace_connection_negotiation)
458 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
459 : : (errmsg("direct SSL connection accepted")));
460 : 0 : return STATUS_OK;
461 : : #else
462 : : /* SSL not supported by this build */
463 : : goto reject;
464 : : #endif
465 : :
466 : : reject:
467 [ # # ]: 0 : if (Trace_connection_negotiation)
468 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
469 : : (errmsg("direct SSL connection rejected")));
470 : 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
471 : 315 : }
472 : :
473 : : /*
474 : : * Read a client's startup packet and do something according to it.
475 : : *
476 : : * Returns STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR, or might call ereport(FATAL) and
477 : : * not return at all.
478 : : *
479 : : * (Note that ereport(FATAL) stuff is sent to the client, so only use it
480 : : * if that's what you want. Return STATUS_ERROR if you don't want to
481 : : * send anything to the client, which would typically be appropriate
482 : : * if we detect a communications failure.)
483 : : *
484 : : * Set ssl_done and/or gss_done when negotiation of an encrypted layer
485 : : * (currently, TLS or GSSAPI) is completed. A successful negotiation of either
486 : : * encryption layer sets both flags, but a rejected negotiation sets only the
487 : : * flag for that layer, since the client may wish to try the other one. We
488 : : * should make no assumption here about the order in which the client may make
489 : : * requests.
490 : : */
491 : : static int
492 : 315 : ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool ssl_done, bool gss_done)
493 : : {
494 : 315 : int32 len;
495 : 315 : char *buf = NULL;
496 : 315 : ProtocolVersion proto;
497 : 315 : MemoryContext oldcontext;
498 : :
499 : 315 : pq_startmsgread();
500 : :
501 : : /*
502 : : * Grab the first byte of the length word separately, so that we can tell
503 : : * whether we have no data at all or an incomplete packet. (This might
504 : : * sound inefficient, but it's not really, because of buffering in
505 : : * pqcomm.c.)
506 : : */
507 [ + - ]: 315 : if (pq_getbytes(&len, 1) == EOF)
508 : : {
509 : : /*
510 : : * If we get no data at all, don't clutter the log with a complaint;
511 : : * such cases often occur for legitimate reasons. An example is that
512 : : * we might be here after responding to NEGOTIATE_SSL_CODE, and if the
513 : : * client didn't like our response, it'll probably just drop the
514 : : * connection. Service-monitoring software also often just opens and
515 : : * closes a connection without sending anything. (So do port
516 : : * scanners, which may be less benign, but it's not really our job to
517 : : * notice those.)
518 : : */
519 : 0 : goto fail;
520 : : }
521 : :
522 [ + - ]: 315 : if (pq_getbytes(((char *) &len) + 1, 3) == EOF)
523 : : {
524 : : /* Got a partial length word, so bleat about that */
525 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (!ssl_done && !gss_done)
526 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
527 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
528 : : errmsg("incomplete startup packet")));
529 : 0 : goto fail;
530 : : }
531 : :
532 : 315 : len = pg_ntoh32(len);
533 : 315 : len -= 4;
534 : :
535 [ + - - + ]: 315 : if (len < (int32) sizeof(ProtocolVersion) ||
536 : 315 : len > MAX_STARTUP_PACKET_LENGTH)
537 : : {
538 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
539 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
540 : : errmsg("invalid length of startup packet")));
541 : 0 : goto fail;
542 : : }
543 : :
544 : : /*
545 : : * Allocate space to hold the startup packet, plus one extra byte that's
546 : : * initialized to be zero. This ensures we will have null termination of
547 : : * all strings inside the packet.
548 : : */
549 : 315 : buf = palloc(len + 1);
550 : 315 : buf[len] = '\0';
551 : :
552 [ + - ]: 315 : if (pq_getbytes(buf, len) == EOF)
553 : : {
554 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
555 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
556 : : errmsg("incomplete startup packet")));
557 : 0 : goto fail;
558 : : }
559 : 315 : pq_endmsgread();
560 : :
561 : : /*
562 : : * The first field is either a protocol version number or a special
563 : : * request code.
564 : : */
565 : 315 : port->proto = proto = pg_ntoh32(*((ProtocolVersion *) buf));
566 : :
567 [ - + ]: 315 : if (proto == CANCEL_REQUEST_CODE)
568 : : {
569 : 0 : ProcessCancelRequestPacket(port, buf, len);
570 : : /* Not really an error, but we don't want to proceed further */
571 : 0 : goto fail;
572 : : }
573 : :
574 [ - + # # ]: 315 : if (proto == NEGOTIATE_SSL_CODE && !ssl_done)
575 : : {
576 : 0 : char SSLok;
577 : :
578 : : #ifdef USE_SSL
579 : :
580 : : /*
581 : : * No SSL when disabled or on Unix sockets.
582 : : *
583 : : * Also no SSL negotiation if we already have a direct SSL connection
584 : : */
585 [ # # # # : 0 : if (!LoadedSSL || port->laddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX || port->ssl_in_use)
# # ]
586 : 0 : SSLok = 'N';
587 : : else
588 : 0 : SSLok = 'S'; /* Support for SSL */
589 : : #else
590 : : SSLok = 'N'; /* No support for SSL */
591 : : #endif
592 : :
593 [ # # ]: 0 : if (Trace_connection_negotiation)
594 : : {
595 [ # # ]: 0 : if (SSLok == 'S')
596 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
597 : : (errmsg("SSLRequest accepted")));
598 : : else
599 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
600 : : (errmsg("SSLRequest rejected")));
601 : 0 : }
602 : :
603 [ # # ]: 0 : while (secure_write(port, &SSLok, 1) != 1)
604 : : {
605 [ # # ]: 0 : if (errno == EINTR)
606 : 0 : continue; /* if interrupted, just retry */
607 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
608 : : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
609 : : errmsg("failed to send SSL negotiation response: %m")));
610 : 0 : goto fail; /* close the connection */
611 : : }
612 : :
613 : : #ifdef USE_SSL
614 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (SSLok == 'S' && secure_open_server(port) == -1)
615 : 0 : goto fail;
616 : : #endif
617 : :
618 : 0 : pfree(buf);
619 : :
620 : : /*
621 : : * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do,
622 : : * it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it wasn't
623 : : * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
624 : : * We report this case to the client.
625 : : */
626 [ # # ]: 0 : if (pq_buffer_remaining_data() > 0)
627 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
628 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
629 : : errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"),
630 : : errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack.")));
631 : :
632 : : /*
633 : : * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not
634 : : * another SSL negotiation request, and a GSS request should only
635 : : * follow if SSL was rejected (client may negotiate in either order)
636 : : */
637 : 0 : return ProcessStartupPacket(port, true, SSLok == 'S');
638 [ # # ]: 0 : }
639 [ - + # # ]: 315 : else if (proto == NEGOTIATE_GSS_CODE && !gss_done)
640 : : {
641 : 0 : char GSSok = 'N';
642 : :
643 : : #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
644 : : /* No GSSAPI encryption when on Unix socket */
645 [ # # ]: 0 : if (port->laddr.addr.ss_family != AF_UNIX)
646 : 0 : GSSok = 'G';
647 : : #endif
648 : :
649 [ # # ]: 0 : if (Trace_connection_negotiation)
650 : : {
651 [ # # ]: 0 : if (GSSok == 'G')
652 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
653 : : (errmsg("GSSENCRequest accepted")));
654 : : else
655 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(LOG,
656 : : (errmsg("GSSENCRequest rejected")));
657 : 0 : }
658 : :
659 [ # # ]: 0 : while (secure_write(port, &GSSok, 1) != 1)
660 : : {
661 [ # # ]: 0 : if (errno == EINTR)
662 : 0 : continue;
663 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
664 : : (errcode_for_socket_access(),
665 : : errmsg("failed to send GSSAPI negotiation response: %m")));
666 : 0 : goto fail; /* close the connection */
667 : : }
668 : :
669 : : #ifdef ENABLE_GSS
670 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (GSSok == 'G' && secure_open_gssapi(port) == -1)
671 : 0 : goto fail;
672 : : #endif
673 : :
674 : 0 : pfree(buf);
675 : :
676 : : /*
677 : : * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do,
678 : : * it was received before we performed the GSS handshake, so it wasn't
679 : : * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle.
680 : : * We report this case to the client.
681 : : */
682 [ # # ]: 0 : if (pq_buffer_remaining_data() > 0)
683 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
684 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
685 : : errmsg("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption request"),
686 : : errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack.")));
687 : :
688 : : /*
689 : : * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not
690 : : * another GSS negotiation request, and an SSL request should only
691 : : * follow if GSS was rejected (client may negotiate in either order)
692 : : */
693 : 0 : return ProcessStartupPacket(port, GSSok == 'G', true);
694 : 0 : }
695 : :
696 : : /* Could add additional special packet types here */
697 : :
698 : : /*
699 : : * Set FrontendProtocol now so that ereport() knows what format to send if
700 : : * we fail during startup. We use the protocol version requested by the
701 : : * client unless it's higher than the latest version we support. It's
702 : : * possible that error message fields might look different in newer
703 : : * protocol versions, but that's something those new clients should be
704 : : * able to deal with.
705 : : */
706 [ + - ]: 315 : FrontendProtocol = Min(proto, PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST);
707 : :
708 : : /* Check that the major protocol version is in range. */
709 [ + - ]: 315 : if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(proto) < PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_EARLIEST) ||
710 : 315 : PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(proto) > PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST))
711 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
712 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
713 : : errmsg("unsupported frontend protocol %u.%u: server supports %u.0 to %u.%u",
714 : : PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(proto), PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(proto),
715 : : PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_EARLIEST),
716 : : PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST),
717 : : PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST))));
718 : :
719 : : /*
720 : : * Now fetch parameters out of startup packet and save them into the Port
721 : : * structure.
722 : : */
723 : 315 : oldcontext = MemoryContextSwitchTo(TopMemoryContext);
724 : :
725 : : /* Handle protocol version 3 startup packet */
726 : : {
727 : 315 : int32 offset = sizeof(ProtocolVersion);
728 : 315 : List *unrecognized_protocol_options = NIL;
729 : :
730 : : /*
731 : : * Scan packet body for name/option pairs. We can assume any string
732 : : * beginning within the packet body is null-terminated, thanks to
733 : : * zeroing extra byte above.
734 : : */
735 : 315 : port->guc_options = NIL;
736 : :
737 [ - + ]: 2139 : while (offset < len)
738 : : {
739 : 2139 : char *nameptr = buf + offset;
740 : 2139 : int32 valoffset;
741 : 2139 : char *valptr;
742 : :
743 [ + + ]: 2139 : if (*nameptr == '\0')
744 : 315 : break; /* found packet terminator */
745 : 1824 : valoffset = offset + strlen(nameptr) + 1;
746 [ - + ]: 1824 : if (valoffset >= len)
747 : 0 : break; /* missing value, will complain below */
748 : 1824 : valptr = buf + valoffset;
749 : :
750 [ + + ]: 1824 : if (strcmp(nameptr, "database") == 0)
751 : 315 : port->database_name = pstrdup(valptr);
752 [ + + ]: 1509 : else if (strcmp(nameptr, "user") == 0)
753 : 315 : port->user_name = pstrdup(valptr);
754 [ + + ]: 1194 : else if (strcmp(nameptr, "options") == 0)
755 : 293 : port->cmdline_options = pstrdup(valptr);
756 [ + - ]: 901 : else if (strcmp(nameptr, "replication") == 0)
757 : : {
758 : : /*
759 : : * Due to backward compatibility concerns the replication
760 : : * parameter is a hybrid beast which allows the value to be
761 : : * either boolean or the string 'database'. The latter
762 : : * connects to a specific database which is e.g. required for
763 : : * logical decoding while.
764 : : */
765 [ # # ]: 0 : if (strcmp(valptr, "database") == 0)
766 : : {
767 : 0 : am_walsender = true;
768 : 0 : am_db_walsender = true;
769 : 0 : }
770 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (!parse_bool(valptr, &am_walsender))
771 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
772 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
773 : : errmsg("invalid value for parameter \"%s\": \"%s\"",
774 : : "replication",
775 : : valptr),
776 : : errhint("Valid values are: \"false\", 0, \"true\", 1, \"database\".")));
777 : 0 : }
778 [ + - ]: 901 : else if (strncmp(nameptr, "_pq_.", 5) == 0)
779 : : {
780 : : /*
781 : : * Any option beginning with _pq_. is reserved for use as a
782 : : * protocol-level option, but at present no such options are
783 : : * defined.
784 : : */
785 : 0 : unrecognized_protocol_options =
786 : 0 : lappend(unrecognized_protocol_options, pstrdup(nameptr));
787 : 0 : }
788 : : else
789 : : {
790 : : /* Assume it's a generic GUC option */
791 : 1802 : port->guc_options = lappend(port->guc_options,
792 : 901 : pstrdup(nameptr));
793 : 1802 : port->guc_options = lappend(port->guc_options,
794 : 901 : pstrdup(valptr));
795 : :
796 : : /*
797 : : * Copy application_name to port if we come across it. This
798 : : * is done so we can log the application_name in the
799 : : * connection authorization message. Note that the GUC would
800 : : * be used but we haven't gone through GUC setup yet.
801 : : */
802 [ + + ]: 901 : if (strcmp(nameptr, "application_name") == 0)
803 : : {
804 : 315 : port->application_name = pg_clean_ascii(valptr, 0);
805 : 315 : }
806 : : }
807 : 1824 : offset = valoffset + strlen(valptr) + 1;
808 [ - + + ]: 2139 : }
809 : :
810 : : /*
811 : : * If we didn't find a packet terminator exactly at the end of the
812 : : * given packet length, complain.
813 : : */
814 [ + - ]: 315 : if (offset != len - 1)
815 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
816 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
817 : : errmsg("invalid startup packet layout: expected terminator as last byte")));
818 : :
819 : : /*
820 : : * If the client requested a newer protocol version or if the client
821 : : * requested any protocol options we didn't recognize, let them know
822 : : * the newest minor protocol version we do support and the names of
823 : : * any unrecognized options.
824 : : */
825 [ + - - + ]: 315 : if (PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(proto) > PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST) ||
826 : 315 : unrecognized_protocol_options != NIL)
827 : 0 : SendNegotiateProtocolVersion(unrecognized_protocol_options);
828 : 315 : }
829 : :
830 : : /* Check a user name was given. */
831 [ + - ]: 315 : if (port->user_name == NULL || port->user_name[0] == '\0')
832 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(FATAL,
833 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
834 : : errmsg("no PostgreSQL user name specified in startup packet")));
835 : :
836 : : /* The database defaults to the user name. */
837 [ + - + - ]: 315 : if (port->database_name == NULL || port->database_name[0] == '\0')
838 : 0 : port->database_name = pstrdup(port->user_name);
839 : :
840 : : /*
841 : : * Truncate given database and user names to length of a Postgres name.
842 : : * This avoids lookup failures when overlength names are given.
843 : : */
844 [ + - ]: 315 : if (strlen(port->database_name) >= NAMEDATALEN)
845 : 0 : port->database_name[NAMEDATALEN - 1] = '\0';
846 [ + - ]: 315 : if (strlen(port->user_name) >= NAMEDATALEN)
847 : 0 : port->user_name[NAMEDATALEN - 1] = '\0';
848 : :
849 [ - + ]: 315 : if (am_walsender)
850 : 0 : MyBackendType = B_WAL_SENDER;
851 : : else
852 : 315 : MyBackendType = B_BACKEND;
853 : :
854 : : /*
855 : : * Normal walsender backends, e.g. for streaming replication, are not
856 : : * connected to a particular database. But walsenders used for logical
857 : : * replication need to connect to a specific database. We allow streaming
858 : : * replication commands to be issued even if connected to a database as it
859 : : * can make sense to first make a basebackup and then stream changes
860 : : * starting from that.
861 : : */
862 [ - + # # ]: 315 : if (am_walsender && !am_db_walsender)
863 : 0 : port->database_name[0] = '\0';
864 : :
865 : : /*
866 : : * Done filling the Port structure
867 : : */
868 : 315 : MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcontext);
869 : :
870 : 315 : pfree(buf);
871 : :
872 : 315 : return STATUS_OK;
873 : :
874 : : fail:
875 : : /* be tidy, just to avoid Valgrind complaints */
876 [ # # ]: 0 : if (buf)
877 : 0 : pfree(buf);
878 : :
879 : 0 : return STATUS_ERROR;
880 : 315 : }
881 : :
882 : : /*
883 : : * The client has sent a cancel request packet, not a normal
884 : : * start-a-new-connection packet. Perform the necessary processing. Nothing
885 : : * is sent back to the client.
886 : : */
887 : : static void
888 : 0 : ProcessCancelRequestPacket(Port *port, void *pkt, int pktlen)
889 : : {
890 : 0 : CancelRequestPacket *canc;
891 : 0 : int len;
892 : :
893 [ # # ]: 0 : if (pktlen < offsetof(CancelRequestPacket, cancelAuthCode))
894 : : {
895 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
896 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
897 : : errmsg("invalid length of cancel request packet")));
898 : 0 : return;
899 : : }
900 : 0 : len = pktlen - offsetof(CancelRequestPacket, cancelAuthCode);
901 [ # # # # ]: 0 : if (len == 0 || len > 256)
902 : : {
903 [ # # # # ]: 0 : ereport(COMMERROR,
904 : : (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
905 : : errmsg("invalid length of cancel key in cancel request packet")));
906 : 0 : return;
907 : : }
908 : :
909 : 0 : canc = (CancelRequestPacket *) pkt;
910 : 0 : SendCancelRequest(pg_ntoh32(canc->backendPID), canc->cancelAuthCode, len);
911 [ # # ]: 0 : }
912 : :
913 : : /*
914 : : * Send a NegotiateProtocolVersion to the client. This lets the client know
915 : : * that they have either requested a newer minor protocol version than we are
916 : : * able to speak, or at least one protocol option that we don't understand, or
917 : : * possibly both. FrontendProtocol has already been set to the version
918 : : * requested by the client or the highest version we know how to speak,
919 : : * whichever is older. If the highest version that we know how to speak is too
920 : : * old for the client, it can abandon the connection.
921 : : *
922 : : * We also include in the response a list of protocol options we didn't
923 : : * understand. This allows clients to include optional parameters that might
924 : : * be present either in newer protocol versions or third-party protocol
925 : : * extensions without fear of having to reconnect if those options are not
926 : : * understood, while at the same time making certain that the client is aware
927 : : * of which options were actually accepted.
928 : : */
929 : : static void
930 : 0 : SendNegotiateProtocolVersion(List *unrecognized_protocol_options)
931 : : {
932 : 0 : StringInfoData buf;
933 : 0 : ListCell *lc;
934 : :
935 : 0 : pq_beginmessage(&buf, PqMsg_NegotiateProtocolVersion);
936 : 0 : pq_sendint32(&buf, FrontendProtocol);
937 : 0 : pq_sendint32(&buf, list_length(unrecognized_protocol_options));
938 [ # # # # : 0 : foreach(lc, unrecognized_protocol_options)
# # ]
939 : 0 : pq_sendstring(&buf, lfirst(lc));
940 : 0 : pq_endmessage(&buf);
941 : :
942 : : /* no need to flush, some other message will follow */
943 : 0 : }
944 : :
945 : :
946 : : /*
947 : : * SIGTERM while processing startup packet.
948 : : *
949 : : * Running proc_exit() from a signal handler would be quite unsafe.
950 : : * However, since we have not yet touched shared memory, we can just
951 : : * pull the plug and exit without running any atexit handlers.
952 : : *
953 : : * One might be tempted to try to send a message, or log one, indicating
954 : : * why we are disconnecting. However, that would be quite unsafe in itself.
955 : : * Also, it seems undesirable to provide clues about the database's state
956 : : * to a client that has not yet completed authentication, or even sent us
957 : : * a startup packet.
958 : : */
959 : : static void
960 : 0 : process_startup_packet_die(SIGNAL_ARGS)
961 : : {
962 : 0 : _exit(1);
963 : : }
964 : :
965 : : /*
966 : : * Timeout while processing startup packet.
967 : : * As for process_startup_packet_die(), we exit via _exit(1).
968 : : */
969 : : static void
970 : 0 : StartupPacketTimeoutHandler(void)
971 : : {
972 : 0 : _exit(1);
973 : : }
974 : :
975 : : /*
976 : : * Helper for the log_connections GUC check hook.
977 : : *
978 : : * `elemlist` is a listified version of the string input passed to the
979 : : * log_connections GUC check hook, check_log_connections().
980 : : * check_log_connections() is responsible for cleaning up `elemlist`.
981 : : *
982 : : * validate_log_connections_options() returns false if an error was
983 : : * encountered and the GUC input could not be validated and true otherwise.
984 : : *
985 : : * `flags` returns the flags that should be stored in the log_connections GUC
986 : : * by its assign hook.
987 : : */
988 : : static bool
989 : 6 : validate_log_connections_options(List *elemlist, uint32 *flags)
990 : : {
991 : 6 : ListCell *l;
992 : 6 : char *item;
993 : :
994 : : /*
995 : : * For backwards compatibility, we accept these tokens by themselves.
996 : : *
997 : : * Prior to PostgreSQL 18, log_connections was a boolean GUC that accepted
998 : : * any unambiguous substring of 'true', 'false', 'yes', 'no', 'on', and
999 : : * 'off'. Since log_connections became a list of strings in 18, we only
1000 : : * accept complete option strings.
1001 : : */
1002 : : static const struct config_enum_entry compat_options[] = {
1003 : : {"off", 0},
1004 : : {"false", 0},
1005 : : {"no", 0},
1006 : : {"0", 0},
1007 : : {"on", LOG_CONNECTION_ON},
1008 : : {"true", LOG_CONNECTION_ON},
1009 : : {"yes", LOG_CONNECTION_ON},
1010 : : {"1", LOG_CONNECTION_ON},
1011 : : };
1012 : :
1013 : 6 : *flags = 0;
1014 : :
1015 : : /* If an empty string was passed, we're done */
1016 [ - + ]: 6 : if (list_length(elemlist) == 0)
1017 : 6 : return true;
1018 : :
1019 : : /*
1020 : : * Now check for the backwards compatibility options. They must always be
1021 : : * specified on their own, so we error out if the first option is a
1022 : : * backwards compatibility option and other options are also specified.
1023 : : */
1024 : 0 : item = linitial(elemlist);
1025 : :
1026 [ # # # # ]: 0 : for (size_t i = 0; i < lengthof(compat_options); i++)
1027 : : {
1028 : 0 : struct config_enum_entry option = compat_options[i];
1029 : :
1030 [ # # ]: 0 : if (pg_strcasecmp(item, option.name) != 0)
1031 : 0 : continue;
1032 : :
1033 [ # # ]: 0 : if (list_length(elemlist) > 1)
1034 : : {
1035 : 0 : GUC_check_errdetail("Cannot specify log_connections option \"%s\" in a list with other options.",
1036 : 0 : item);
1037 : 0 : return false;
1038 : : }
1039 : :
1040 : 0 : *flags = option.val;
1041 : 0 : return true;
1042 [ # # ]: 0 : }
1043 : :
1044 : : /* Now check the aspect options. The empty string was already handled */
1045 [ # # # # : 0 : foreach(l, elemlist)
# # # # ]
1046 : : {
1047 : : static const struct config_enum_entry options[] = {
1048 : : {"receipt", LOG_CONNECTION_RECEIPT},
1049 : : {"authentication", LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHENTICATION},
1050 : : {"authorization", LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHORIZATION},
1051 : : {"setup_durations", LOG_CONNECTION_SETUP_DURATIONS},
1052 : : {"all", LOG_CONNECTION_ALL},
1053 : : };
1054 : :
1055 : 0 : item = lfirst(l);
1056 [ # # # # : 0 : for (size_t i = 0; i < lengthof(options); i++)
# ]
1057 : : {
1058 : 0 : struct config_enum_entry option = options[i];
1059 : :
1060 [ # # ]: 0 : if (pg_strcasecmp(item, option.name) == 0)
1061 : : {
1062 : 0 : *flags |= option.val;
1063 : 0 : goto next;
1064 : : }
1065 [ # # ]: 0 : }
1066 : :
1067 : 0 : GUC_check_errdetail("Invalid option \"%s\".", item);
1068 : 0 : return false;
1069 : :
1070 : : next: ;
1071 : 0 : }
1072 : :
1073 : 0 : return true;
1074 : 6 : }
1075 : :
1076 : :
1077 : : /*
1078 : : * GUC check hook for log_connections
1079 : : */
1080 : : bool
1081 : 6 : check_log_connections(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source)
1082 : : {
1083 : 6 : uint32 flags;
1084 : 6 : char *rawstring;
1085 : 6 : List *elemlist;
1086 : 6 : bool success;
1087 : :
1088 : : /* Need a modifiable copy of string */
1089 : 6 : rawstring = pstrdup(*newval);
1090 : :
1091 [ - + ]: 6 : if (!SplitIdentifierString(rawstring, ',', &elemlist))
1092 : : {
1093 : 0 : GUC_check_errdetail("Invalid list syntax in parameter \"%s\".", "log_connections");
1094 : 0 : pfree(rawstring);
1095 : 0 : list_free(elemlist);
1096 : 0 : return false;
1097 : : }
1098 : :
1099 : : /* Validation logic is all in the helper */
1100 : 6 : success = validate_log_connections_options(elemlist, &flags);
1101 : :
1102 : : /* Time for cleanup */
1103 : 6 : pfree(rawstring);
1104 : 6 : list_free(elemlist);
1105 : :
1106 [ + - ]: 6 : if (!success)
1107 : 0 : return false;
1108 : :
1109 : : /*
1110 : : * We succeeded, so allocate `extra` and save the flags there for use by
1111 : : * assign_log_connections().
1112 : : */
1113 : 6 : *extra = guc_malloc(LOG, sizeof(int));
1114 [ + - ]: 6 : if (!*extra)
1115 : 0 : return false;
1116 : 6 : *((int *) *extra) = flags;
1117 : :
1118 : 6 : return true;
1119 : 6 : }
1120 : :
1121 : : /*
1122 : : * GUC assign hook for log_connections
1123 : : */
1124 : : void
1125 : 6 : assign_log_connections(const char *newval, void *extra)
1126 : : {
1127 : 6 : log_connections = *((int *) extra);
1128 : 6 : }
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